With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model for such a setting is the wire tap channel system introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channel systems. We provide a novel proof for the secrecy capacity theorem for wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel system and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide complete security at rates below secrecy capacity in some specific cases.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The notion of communication with perfect security was defined in information-theoretic terms by Shannon [1] . Suppose a k-bit message M is to be transmitted securely from Alice to Bob across a public channel. Perfect security is said to be achieved if the encoding of M into a transmitted word X is such that the mutual information I(M; X) = 0. From this definition, Shannon concluded that Alice and Bob should necessarily share k bits of key for achieving perfect security.
An alternative notion of communication with perfect security was introduced by Wyner [2] . Wyner introduced the wire tap channel, which has matured into a system depicted in Fig. 1 . In a wire tap channel system, the honest parties Alice and Bob are separated by a channel C1 called the main channel. The important modification when compared to Shannon's study of security is that any eavesdropper Eve observes information transmitted by Alice through another channel C2 called the wiretapper's channel. C1 and C2 are assumed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) (securely) communicate a k-bit message M across C1. Alice encodes M into an n-bit transmitted word X. The legitimate receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve receive X through two different channels C1 and C2, respectively. Bob's and Eve's observations are denoted Y and Z, respectively. Alice's encoding should achieve two objectives: (1) [Security] Z provides no information about M, or the mutual information I(M; Z) = 0 (2) [Reliability] Y can be decoded into M with negligibly small probability of error. Wyner showed that both objectives can be attained by forward coding without any key bits if the channels C1 and C2 satisfy some conditions. The rate k/n is called the secrecy rate.
Secrecy capacity of a wire tap channel system is the largest k/n for which the objectives of secure and reliable communication is achievable. Secrecy capacity is a function of the channels C1 and C2. If the capacity of C1 is greater than the capacity of II. CODING FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL SYSTEM In a general wire tap channel system ( Fig. 1 ), C1 and C2 are discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). The two DMCs have the same input alphabet but different output alphabet. C1 is denoted X → Y , where X is a random variable denoting an input symbol to C1, and Y is a random variable denoting an output symbol from C1. Similarly, C2 is denoted X → Z. A sequence of N input symbols is denoted by X N or X. Y N and Y, and Z N and Z have similar notations for the outputs. C1 and C2 of a wire tap channel system are called the main channel and wire tap channel, respectively.
A. Secrecy capacity of the wire tap channel system
The notion of secrecy capacity, as introduced by Wyner [2] , has an operational meaning of being the maximum possible rate of information transmission between Alice and Bob that still enables Eve to be kept totally ignorant. Before defining the operational meaning precisely, we look at the calculation of secrecy capacity for a given wire tap channel system. The secrecy capacity C s for a general wire tap channel system can be calculated as follows [3] :
where the maximum is over all possible random variables V in joint distribution with X, Y and Z such that V → X → (Y, Z) is a Markov chain. The random variable V does not have a direct physical meaning; it is used for calculation purposes. Note that C s could turn out to be zero or negative in some cases. At present, the calculation of secrecy capacity is an unsolved problem when C1 and C2 are general DMCs. However, the calculation of secrecy capacity can be simplified for some special cases that impose restrictions on the wire tap channel with respect to the main channel. If I(V ; Y ) ≥ I(V ; Z) for all Markov chains V → X → (Y, Z), the main channel is said to be less noisy than the wire tap channel. If the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel [3] , then
where the maximum is over all possible distributions P X (x) of X. Moreover, as shown in [6] , I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z) is a convex function of P X (x) when the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel; hence, the secrecy capacity can be calculated using convex optimization methods. It was further shown in [6] that if I(X; Y ) and I(X; Z) are individually maximized by the same P X (x), and the main channel (X → Y ) is less noisy than the wire tap channel (X → Z), then
where Capacity(.) refers to the usual channel capacity.
B. Coding method
The coding problem for Alice in the wire tap channel system involves adding redundancy for enabling Bob to correct errors (across the main channel) and adding randomness for keeping Eve ignorant (across the wire tap channel). The coding method presented here is not strictly new. It is present in the inner workings of the proofs in [2] and [3] . However, our method of proof of security and existence lends itself to a simple design method for codes over a wire tap channel system. Note that the coding method uses classical error-correcting codes, but the encoding operation is completely different and incorporates a degree of randomness.
Let us assume that Alice needs to transmit one out of M equally likely messages i.e. a message denoted u is such that u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , M } and Prob{u = i} = 1/M . Alice uses M codes C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ M with |C i | = L and block-length N . Each codeword of C i consists of N symbols from the input alphabet of the main or wire tap channel. We let the common input alphabet to the two channels be {1, 2, · · · , K}. A symbol of the input alphabet is denoted k. A message u is encoded into a transmitted word x as follows: x is chosen uniformly at random from the code C u . The coding method is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The transmitted word x , in general, belongs to the overall code C = ∪ i C i . The rate of information transmission from Alice to Bob (in terms of bits per channel use) in such a setting is given by log 2 M/N . The receiver on the main channel (Bob) decodes a received word y with respect to the overall code C into a decoded messageû (say, by Maximum-Likelihood (MaxL) decoding). We let the output alphabet of the main channel be {1, 2, · · · , J m } denoting a symbol by j m . The eavesdropper on the wire tap channel is assumed to have unlimited power to process the received word z. We let the output alphabet of the wire tap channel be {1, 2, · · · , J w } denoting a symbol by j w . The objective of Alice and Bob in a wire tap channel system can now be given a precise definition. Let U,Û, and Z be random variables denoting Alice's message, Bob's decoded message, and Eve's received word, respectively. Let H(V ) represent the entropy of a random variable V . Then, the objective is to achieve the following:
The constraint (5) is referred to as the security constraint, while (4) is called the reliability constraint. If an encoder (as in Fig. 2 ) with R s = log 2 M/N satisfies the security and reliability constraints for a given wire tap channel system, then such an encoder is said to achieve a secrecy rate R s .
C. Security of the coding method
The security constraint is of paramount importance in the design of an encoder for a wire tap channel system. The following choice of the codes C u satisfies the security constraint: Each C u should approach capacity over the wire tap channel (similar to the special case considered by Wyner in [2] ). We present the criterion in the following theorem (the notation used is from Fig. 2 and Section II-B).
Theorem 1: If the codes C u , u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , M } achieve capacity over the wire tap channel, then Prob{U = u|Z = z} = Prob{U = u}.
Proof: By Baye's rule,
Hence, to prove the theorem we need to show Prob{Z = z|U = u} = Prob{Z = z}. Now,
Each C u achieves capacity on the DMC X → Z; if the codewords of C u are used with uniform probability 1/|C u |, the mutual information across the DMC
We use the following fact: the output probability vector that achieves capacity of a DMC is unique [17, Corollary 2 (Page 96)]. Since C u achieves capacity for all u, the RHS of (6) becomes equal to p(z), the unique output probability of z that achieves capacity in the DMC
The basic reason for security is that the capacity-achieving output probability vector is unique. Each message corresponds to a code that achieves capacity over the wire tap channel, and a codeword from the code is selected uniformly at random. Hence, each message results in the exact same output distribution for Z. No amount of processing by Eve can help her distinguish between events that result in the same probability distribution for the received vector.
If the codes C u approach the capacity of the wire tap channel, the continuity of mutual information with respect to the input and output probability vectors ensures that Prob{U = u|Z = z} → Prob{U = u}, and the security constraint can be satisfied to arbitrary accuracy.
D. Existence of reliable encoders
In this section, we determine a random coding bound on the probability of error Prob{U =Û} in a manner following Gallager [17, Section 5.6] . Let x be a vector of N input symbols, y a vector of N main channel output symbols, and z a vector of N wire tap channel output symbols. Let T N (y|x) and S N (z|x) be the transition probabilities for the main channel and wire tap channel, respectively. Let T S N (y, z|x) be the joint distribution.
We now define a random code ensemble for the coding method of Section II-B. Let Q N (x) be an arbitrary probability assignment on the set of length N input sequences. A set of M L words is chosen pairwise independently from the set of length N input sequences according to Q N (x). The words are arranged in an M × L array indexed by a pair of coordinates u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , M } and v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}; each word is denoted x m , where m = (u, v). Each row is considered to be the code
Let us assume that a message u is to be transmitted by Alice. Let us further assume that the word x m with m = (u, v) is chosen for transmission from C u . Let y and z be the received vectors for Bob and Eve, respectively. We will upper bound the probability of an event E, which captures both the security and reliability constraints. The event E is the union of the following two events:
. This event captures the security requirement. The probability of E averaged over the ensemble for the m = (u, v)-th word is
Using a modified union bound,
Similarly,
Using the simplifications in (7),
.
we get a version of Theorem 5.6.1 in Gallager [17] . Following Gallager [17, Section 5.6] further for the case of discrete memoryless channels, we let
where the input vector x = [x 1 x 2 · · · x N ] in terms of its components, and Q(k), k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} is an arbitrary probability assignment on the input alphabet. Similarly, we let T N (y|x) = N n=1 T (y n |x n ) and S N (z|x) = N n=1 S(z n |x n ). Converting to exponential relationships, we get
where
;
Note that the secrecy rate of a code from the ensemble is R s = R 1 − R 2 . Using a distribution Pr{m} in (8), we get
The random coding exponent for the wire tap channel is defined as follows:
Let Q 2 be the distribution on the input symbols that maximizes the random coding exponent E w (R 2 ). To satisfy the security constraint of Section II-C, we restrict ourselves to ensemble of codes with input symbol distribution Q 2 (k). We can now define another random coding exponent for the main channel as follows:
Using the random coding exponents in (11), we get the following theorem. Theorem 2: For an ensemble of codes using the maximizing distribution Q 2 ,
We know that E w (R 2 ) > 0 for 0 ≤ R 2 < C w , where C w is the channel capacity of the wire tap channel. Hence, Theorem 2 says that there exists a code in a suitable ensemble such that the security constraint can be satisfied (each C u can approach capacity on the wire tap channel) with arbitrary accuracy by increasing the block-length; at the same time, the same code can satisfy the reliability constraint with arbitrary accuracy provided the rate R 1 is such that E m (R 1 ) > 0. From the properties of random coding exponents [17, Section 5.6], we see that
Hence, the maximum secrecy rate achievable by a code from the ensemble is I(Q 2 ; S) − C w . We immediately see that for the special case of a wire tap channel system considered in (3) secrecy capacity is achievable by some code in the ensemble. In particular, if both the main channel and wire tap channel are symmetric, secrecy capacity is achievable. For more general channels, we believe a carefully constructed error event E could potentially be used to prove stronger results.
E. Remarks
In summary, we have shown that secrecy capacity can be achieved for wire tap channel systems with symmetric DMCs using codes that achieve capacity over the wire tap channel. A significant drawback is that capacity-achieving codes are essential for guaranteeing the security of the method. Since capacity-achieving codes are not practical in many settings, design of practical codes that are secure is an important problem that needs to be addressed. If the resulting code is practical and secure, transmission rates below secrecy capacity are certainly acceptable. The remainder of this paper is concerned with developing practical codes and protocols for wire tap channel systems. In some simple settings, practical methods that achieve secrecy capacity are given.
III. CODE DESIGN FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL SYSTEM
In this section, we study the design and use of linear codes over a wire tap channel system. We use a method that was first introduced and studied by Wyner [2] , [9] for two specific cases. We have extended Wyner's study by considering other wire tap channel systems. We have also provided better, implementable codes for the cases studied by Wyner.
A. Coding method
We consider a coding method similar to Fig. 2 but with linear codes and cosets. To transmit k-bit messages, we first select a (n, l) linear binary code C such that k ≥ n − l. Out of the 2 n−l cosets of C, we choose 2 k cosets and let each message correspond to a chosen coset. The selection of the cosets is done in a linear fashion. Suppose G is a generator matrix for C with rows g 1 , g 2 , · · · , and g l . We select k linearly independent vectors h 1 , h 2 , · · · , and h k from {0, 1} n \ C. The coset corresponding to a k-bit message s = [s 1 s 2 · · · s k ] is determined as follows:
Though the above correspondence is deterministic, the encoding procedure has a random component in the selection of the transmitted word. A k-bit message s is encoded into a n-bit word randomly selected from the coset of C corresponding to s. Hence, the transmitted word, x, is given by
is an uniformly random l-bit vector. The overall encoding operation can be described as a matrix multiplication. Let G * be the l × n matrix with rows h 1 , h 2 , · · · , and h l . Then,
Hence, x belongs to the code C with generator matrix
The goal of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is to determine s from their respective received vectors. Restating the conditions of Section II-B, the design of the codes C and C should be such that (1) s can be determined without error across the main channel, and (2) every s is equally likely across the wiretapper's channel.
Guided by the results of the previous sections, we could choose C as a capacity-achieving code over the wiretapper's channel. However, designing a code C that can be decoded across the main channel is still a challenge. Moreover, capacityachieving codes have not yet been demonstrated in practice for many channels. In the following sections, we look at some design approaches for some simple wire tap channel systems. The encoding method and notation will remain the same for all cases.
IV. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
We begin with the simplest possible wire tap channel system with a binary erasure channel (BEC) as the wiretapper's channel and a noiseless main channel. This scenario is shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , the wiretapper's channel has been denoted BEC(1 − ǫ) i.e. the probability of erasure in the wiretapper's channel is 1 − ǫ. The probability that a bit is leaked to the wiretapper is ǫ. This notation has been chosen for future convenience. We will denote the wire tap channel system of Fig. 3 as EWT(ǫ). Using (3), we see that the secrecy capacity of an EWT(ǫ) is
The coding method across an EWT(ǫ) is illustrated in Fig. 4 . In the figure, S is the random variable denoting the k-bit message to be transmitted. The code C is chosen to be an (n, n − k) code, and the code C is chosen to be the entire vector space {0, 1}
n . The transmitted n-tuple is denoted by the random variable X = [X 1 X 2 · · · X n ]. Note that the message S can be seen as a syndrome of C with respect to a carefully constructed k × n parity-check matrix H. Since the channel between Alice and Bob is error-free, Bob finds the message as follows: S = HX T (mod 2). The secret information rate is R = k/n. From (14), we see that for secure transmission,
Assuming that all messages are equally likely, we have X i = 0 or X i = 1 with probability 1/2 each. The eavesdropper learns X i with probability ǫ. That is, the random variable Z = [Z 1 Z 2 · · · Z n ] is such that Z i = X i with probability ǫ, and Z i =? (unknown or erasure) with probability 1 − ǫ. 
A. Security Criterion
To develop a security criterion for the choice of C, we calculate the eavesdropper's uncertainty H(S|Z) by first evaluating H(S|Z = z). Note that the eavesdropper is given complete knowledge of the code C and infinite computational power. The main source of uncertainty is the uniformly random selection of the transmitted word X from the coset of C corresponding to the message S.
If a coset of C contains at least one vector that agrees with z ∈ {0, 1, ?} n in the unerased positions, we say that the coset is consistent with z. Each consistent coset corresponds to a possible message for the eavesdropper. Let N (C, z) denote the total number of cosets of C consistent with z. Since each message is equally likely a priori, we get
For an (n, n − k) code C, the maximum possible value for N (C, z) is the total number of cosets 2 k . If N (C, z) = 2 k , we say that z is secured by C since the eavesdropper's Prob{S = s|Z = z} = 1/2 k for every possible message s. The following theorem (adapted from [9, Lemma 3]) states a condition for a vector z to be secured by a code C.
Theorem 3 (Ozarow, Wyner '84) : Let an (n, n − k) code C have a generator matrix G = [a 1 · · · a n ], where a i is the ith column of G. Consider an instance of the eavesdropper's observation z ∈ {0, 1, ?} n with µ unerased positions given by {i :
Proof: If G µ has rank µ, the code C has all 2 µ possible µ-tuples in the µ unerased positions. So each coset of C also has all 2 µ possible µ-tuples in the µ revealed positions. So N (C, z) = 2 k . If G µ has rank less than µ, the code C does not have all µ-tuples in the µ unerased positions. So there exists at least one coset that does not contain a given µ-tuple in the µ unerased positions, and N (C, z) < 2 k . If all possible random vectors z obtained over a BEC(1 − ǫ) are secured with probability close to one by an (n, n − k) code C, rate k/n is achievable with perfect secrecy over an EWT(ǫ).
B. Using duals of codes on graphs
We now study the use of the threshold property of codes on graphs for providing security over an erasure wire tap channel. We illustrate the method using Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes. The extension to other codes on graphs is shown in examples.
Consider a bipartite graph ensemble C n (λ, ρ) with n left nodes and left and right edge degree distribution polynomials λ(x) and ρ(x), respectively [18] . The adjacency matrix of a graph from the ensemble provides the parity-check matrix of a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code. Let the threshold for C n (λ, ρ) over the binary erasure channel be α * (λ, ρ). The threshold property has the following straight-forward interpretation:
Theorem 4: Let M be a parity-check matrix of an LDPC code from the ensemble C n (λ, ρ). A submatrix formed by selecting columns of M independently with probability α will have full column rank for α < α * (λ, ρ) for large k with high probability. Theorem 4 enables the use of duals of LDPC codes as the code C over an EWT(ǫ) as shown in Fig. 4 . We let a matrix M from the ensemble C n (λ, ρ) to be the generator matrix for C. By Theorem 4, the columns of the matrix M corresponding to the leaked bits over a BEC(1 − ǫ) will have full rank with high probability whenever ǫ < α * λ, ρ). Note that the probability that a bit is leaked across a BEC(1 − ǫ) is equal to ǫ. In combination with Theorem 3, we see that the code C with generator matrix M provides complete security with probability tending to one for large block-length over an EWT(ǫ) with ǫ < α * (λ, ρ). Example 1: The C n (x 2 , x 5 ) ensemble of (3, 6)-regular LDPC codes has threshold α * (x 2 , x 5 ) ≈ 0.42. Let M be an adjacency matrix from the ensemble with large n (say, n > 10 5 ). M is an n/2 × n binary matrix with row weight 3 and column weight 6. The (n, n/2) code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT(ǫ) for ǫ < 0.42 with perfect secrecy. The information rate between the honest parties in this case is R = 0.5 compared to the upper bound of 1 − ǫ = 0.58 (from (15)). (In practice, the value of ǫ could be reasonably lesser than 0.42 for added security.)
The above argument can be extended to other ensembles of codes on graphs that have capacity-achieving thresholds over the binary erasure channel. We illustrate the method with the following example.
Example 2 (Tornado codes):
A rate-2/3 tornado code ensemble with threshold δ = 0.33257 has been reported in [19] . A parity-check matrix M for a code from the ensemble will have dimensions n/3 × n. The (n, n − 2/3n) code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT(ǫ) for ǫ < 0.33257 with perfect secrecy. The information rate between the honest parties in this case is R = 2/3 = 0.66666... compared to the upper bound of 1 − ǫ = 0.66743. Similar examples using the other classes of capacity-approaching ensembles can be constructed. Hence over an erasure wire-tap channel with wire-tap probability ǫ, secure information transmission rates tending to the upper bound of 1 − ǫ are achievable using duals of codes on graphs that approach capacity over the binary erasure channel.
Note that the code C has properties that are opposite to the requirements of Section II-B. While we had proposed to use a code that is capacity-achieving over the wiretapper's channel in Section II-B, we have used the dual of a capacity-achieving code when the wiretapper's channel is a BEC. In fact, using the dual appears to be a more powerful method since security does not depend on capacity-achieving codes. Both possibilities are worth exploring in other wire tap channel systems.
V. ERASURE MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider wire tap systems where both the wire tap channel and the main channel are binary erasure channels (BEC). Though our results apply with a small modification to systems with DMCs other than the BEC as the main channel, we restrict ourselves to the BEC case for ease of explanation.
With a BEC as the main channel, the wire tap system is as shown in Figure 5 . The wiretapper's channel is a BEC with Fig. 5 . The BEC wire tap system erasure probability ǫ w , and the main channel is another BEC with erasure probability ǫ m . According to (3), the secrecy capacity of this system is C s = ǫ w − ǫ m , which is positive whenever ǫ w > ǫ m .
A. Using duals of codes on graphs
As in the noiseless main channel case, we consider using the dual of an LDPC code as the code C for encoding. Using Theorem 4, security across the wiretapper's channel can be related to the threshold α of the LDPC code C ⊥ over erasure channels. Specifically, if 1 − ǫ w < α, perfect security is guaranteed with high probability.
We now turn to the probability of error on the main channel. Suppose we could design the matrix G * such that the overall code C still belongs to an LDPC ensemble with threshold β over erasure channels. Bob can decode x (and hence the message s) with asymptotically zero probability of error whenever ǫ m < β.
In summary, the requirement on the LDPC code C is that it should contain C, the dual of another LDPC code C ⊥ . Since the dual of an LDPC code is likely to have a significantly high number of low-weight codewords, the requirement appears to be contrary to intuition. A very similar code design problem arises in the construction of quantum error-correcting codes using sparse graphs [20] . After studying several constructions, the authors of [20] conclude that such codes are difficult to construct and are unlikely to have high thresholds.
B. Using capacity-achieving codes
We now consider a coding method that will eventually depend on capacity-achieving codes for complete security. We first pick an LDPC code C 1 of length n from an ensemble of codes having asymptotic erasure threshold ǫ w . That means, as n → ∞, C 1 recovers all the erasures on an erasure channel with erasure probability up to at least ǫ w , using the standard iterative erasure decoding algorithm. Let C 1 have rate r 1 , and let H 1 be the parity check matrix of the code C 1 . Next we pick n(1 − r 2 ) independent vectors from the dual space of C 1 , where r 1 < r 2 . Let H 2 be the matrix formed by these vectors as rows. H 2 has dimensions n(1 − r 2 ) × n. Let H 2 be the rest of the independent vectors in the dual space of C 1 . As we will see shortly, we must have ǫ w > (1 − r 2 ) in order to guarantee some equivocation for Eve. Let H 2 be the parity check matrix of a code C 2 . We want C 2 to have asymptotic erasure threshold ǫ m . We then have,
and
Let (λ, ρ) denote the degree distribution of an LDPC code. Let
For all i, λ i and ρ i are non-negative. λ i (ρ i ) denotes the probability that a randomly chosen edge in the Tanner graph of the code is incident on a variable(check) node of degree i. In our examples, we will construct H 2 by picking n(1 − r 2 ) rows of H 1 , and the rest of the rows will be in H 2 . It is then easy to see that, if H 2 corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair (λ 2 , ρ 2 ), and H 2 corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair (λ 2 , ρ 2 ), then H 1 corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair (λ 1 , ρ 1 ), where
We have to choose (λ 1 , ρ 1 ) and (λ 2 , ρ 2 ) in such a way so that for all i, λ 2i and ρ 2i are non-negative. We now discuss the encoding procedure. The encoding procedure in this case is a little different than the encoding procedure when we had a noiseless main channel. Here, Alice first takes a n(r 2 − r 1 )-bit long message vector S, and forms a n(1 − r 1 )-bit long vector by adding n(1 − r 2 ) 0's on top of S. She now chooses an X at random from the solution set of the equation shown in Figure 6 and transmits it. We illustrate this encoding procedure in Figure 7 . Note that, the number of solutions to the equation, H 2 X = 0, is 2 n−n(1−r2) = 2 nr2 . However, for some particular choice of S, say S 1 , the number of solutions to the equation shown in Figure 6 is 2 n−n(1−r1) = 2 nr1 . Obviously, the same X cannot be a solution for two different values of S. This explains the splitting of the solution set space of the equation
solution set of Figure 6 solution set of H 2 X = 0 for S = S 1 solution set of Figure 6 solution set of H 2 X = S 2 Fig. 7 . The encoding space
1) Equivocation across the wire tap channel:
In this section, we calculate the equivocation for Eve. Since Eve's channel is a BEC with erasure probability ǫ w , with probability tending to 1, Eve will have nǫ w erasures as n → ∞. If we have ǫ w > (1−r 2 ), using H 2 X = 0, Eve must have at least 2 n(ǫw−(1−r2)) solutions for X, all of which are equally likely. All these solutions will differ from each other in the erased positions. Since ǫ w is the erasure threshold of the code having H 1 as the parity-check matrix, any submatrix formed using nǫ w columns of H 1 will have full column rank [18] . Thus every solution of H 2 X = 0 will give a different value of S, all of which are equally likely. The equivocation for Eve is then ∆ = n(ǫ w − (1 − r 2 )). If H 1 is the parity-check matrix of a capacity-achieving code on an erasure channel with erasure probability ǫ w , ∆ = n(r 2 − r 1 ), and the message will be completely secure from Eve. Clearly, if the erasure probability of Eve's channel goes up, Eve will still have at least this much equivocation.
2) Probability of error on the main channel: When Bob receives a vector Y, he first decodes it by using the standard iterative erasure decoding technique for LDPC codes on the Tanner graph of the code C 2 . Let the erasure probability of the main channel be at most ǫ m . Then, as n → ∞, with probability tending to 1 he will be able to recover the transmitted word X. Bob then can find out the product H 2 X, which is his estimate of the message S.
Example 3: Let C 2 be a (3, 6)-regular LDPC code with block-length n. Hence, λ 2 (x) = x 2 and ρ 2 (x) = x 5 . C 2 has rate r 2 = 1/2. The code C 1 is chosen to be another LDPC code with all variable nodes having degree 5 and all check nodes having degree 6. Hence, λ 1 (x) = x 4 and ρ 1 (x) = x 5 . C 1 has rate r 1 = 1/6. It can be seen from (21) and (22) that, λ 2 (x) = x and ρ 2 (x) = x 5 . The LDPC code C 2 has an erasure threshold α * ≈ 0.42. The code C 1 has an erasure threshold β * ≈ 0.55. Thus, the secrecy rate is r 2 − r 1 = 1/3, and an equivocation of n(β * − (1 − r 2 )) = 0.05n is guaranteed across the wiretap channel having erasure probability greater than β * = 0.55. Bob can decode the message with asymptotically zero probability of error on the main channel having erasure probability at most α * = 0.42.
C. Multi-photon attacks in QKD systems
We now discuss an attack against a QKD system that can be prevented by using codes designed for a wire tap channel system with a BEC as the wiretapper's channel.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems using the so-called BB84 protocol proceed in two distinct stages [13] , [8] . In the first stage (quantum stage), bits encoded as quantum states are transmitted by Alice in a quantum channel to Bob. At the end of the quantum stage, Alice and Bob share an N -bit raw key with some errors. The second stage (classical stage) is divided into two parts. In the first part (error correction part), the errors in the raw key are corrected by Alice and Bob using an (N, n) code (say). For this purpose, an (N − n)-bit syndrome is sent by Alice to Bob using a public channel. Assuming error correction was successful, Alice and Bob now share an N -bit raw key A with no errors. However, only N − (N − n) = n bits of information in A are secure. To extract the secure bits, the second part of the classical stage (privacy amplification part) is performed. The raw key A is multiplied by a full-rank binary n × N matrix F to get a = FA T (mod 2). In an ideal QKD system that can generate and transmit single photons in the quantum stage, the bit string a would be perfectly secure. That is, for any eavesdropper Prob{a =an n-bit string} = 1 2 n . However, practical systems do not use perfect single photon sources. Occasional transmissions with multiple photons can be used by an eavesdropper in the quantum stage to gain information about a. Practical photon sources emit multiple photons in a pulse with a given probability ǫ [16] . Assuming the bits corresponding to a multiple photon pulse can be tapped by an eavesdropper, the eavesdropping scenario can be modeled as an erasure wire tap channel system with the wire tap channel begin BEC(1 − ǫ).
Example 4 (QKD system):
Consider a QKD system that uses an intensity of α 2 A at Alice's transmitter. If Bob is at a distance of x Kms from Alice, the intensity at Bob's receiver is α A . We make the following assumptions completely favoring Eve: (1) All pulses with two or more photons are intercepted by Eve at the transmitter (2) All multi-photon pulses intercepted by Eve at the transmitter are received by Bob. Hence, the fraction of bits leaked to Eve due to multi-photon pulses is
We model multi-photon attacks and privacy amplification in a QKD system as an EWT(ǫ) with ǫ given by (23) . Interpreting the achievable information rates over an EWT(ǫ) in QKD vocabulary, we see that privacy amplification with rate R → 1 − ǫ can be implemented in QKD systems. Fig. 8 shows a plot of achievable rates at perfect secrecy (1 − ǫ) as a function of distance. 
D. Remarks
We have shown that codes on graphs provide secrecy in erasure wire tap channel systems with maximum possible secure information rate. The codes are efficiently implementable in practice. In QKD systems, the codes can be used for privacy amplification.
VI. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND BSC WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider a special case of a wire tap channel system, where the eavesdropper sees a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with error probability p, denoted BSC(p). The main channel is error free. Using (3), we see that
The wire tap channel system and the encoding is shown in Fig. 9 . The method of coding is illustrated with the same notation as Section III. 
A. Security across a BSC wiretapper's channel
We let C be an (n, n − k) code and C be the entire space {0, 1}
n . For an arbitrary k-bit message S = s, the transmitted word X ∈ sG * + C. Since the cosets of C cover the entire space of n-tuples, Eve's received vector Z belongs to some coset of C, say uG * + C. If e denotes the error vector introduced by the BSC(p) in the wiretap, we have for
We can now state the criterion for selecting the code C to guarantee security of the message S: we choose C such that for any n-tuple w, we have
Using the above condition in (25), we see that Eve is equally likely to find Z in any coset of C given any message S = s. Assuming all S = s are equally likely a priori, Prob{Z ∈ uG * + C} is independent of u; hence, Prob{S = s|Z ∈ uG * + C} ≈ 2 −k , and perfect security is guaranteed. The LHS of (26) is the probability of the coset w + C. This probability was first studied by Sullivan [21] and further extended by Ancheta [22] , [23] . The following results can be extracted from their studies: (1) The requirement of (26) that the probabilities of a code (w = 0) and a coset (w = 0) should be approximately equal can be achieved for large block-length. ( 2) The properties of the dual of a code plays an important role in the probability of a coset. We expand on these two results in the next sections to design codes for the BSC wire tap channel system.
B. Choosing the code C: Security criterion
Using the MacWilliams identities [24, Page 127] for the (n, n − k) linear code C, we get
where A ′ i is the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C ⊥ 2 . Using x = 1 − p, y = p, and
Using the MacWilliams identities [24, Page 137] for the coset w + C, we get
with α i (w) equal to the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C wt(e) (1 − p) n−wt(e) = 2
That implies that the second term in the RHS of (30) can be neglected with respect to the first term 2 −k , and the proof is complete. The criterion for the selection of C is that the dual C ⊥ should have a weight distribution that satisfies (31).
C. Some code constructions
We provide some examples of codes that satisfy the requirement of (31). Example 5: (Single parity check codes) The dual of a (n, n − 1, 2) single parity check code is the (n, 1, n) repetition code with weight distribution
for large n. However, the secrecy rate 1/n → 0 for large n. This is an example that was first used by Wyner in [2] to motivate coding over a wire tap channel system. 
for large n. As in the previous example, the secrecy rate tends to zero for large n.
The following theorem generalizes the above construction method. Theorem 6: Let {C (n) } be a sequence of (n, n − k n ) codes such that Prob{Detection Error}≤ 2 −kn over a BSC(p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and lim n→∞ {k n /n} < log 2 (1/(1 − p)). Let A ′ i be the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C ⊥ (n) . Then for any n-tuple w,
Proof: We are given that for the code C (n)
Prob{Detection Error} = e∈C (n) ;e =0 p wt(e) (1 − p) n−wt(e) ≤ 2 −kn .
Adding (1 − p) n to both sides and using the MacWilliams identities, we get e∈C (n) p wt(e) (1 − p) n−wt(e) = 2 −kn + 2
n(kn/n−log 2 (1/(1−p))) .
Since lim n→∞ {k n /n} < log 2 (1/(1 − p)) and the LHS above is nonnegative,
The existence of (n, n − k n ) linear codes with probability of detection error less than 2 −kn is well known [25, Section 3.6 ]. Suppose we find a class of such error detecting codes such that R = lim n→∞ k n n .
Then, for large n, the code C (n) , when used as the code C over a wire tap channel system with a BSC(p) as the wiretapper's channel, provides perfect security whenever R < − log 2 (1 − p), or p > 1 − 2 −R . The maximum possible secrecy rate that can be achieved by this construction is therefore − log 2 (1 − p).
Codes such as Hamming codes and double error-correcting BCH codes are examples of such error-detecting codes. However, most known class of such codes have R = 0.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, the approach taken to designing encoders that provide security and reliability over a wire tap channel system is the following. Any two codes C 1 and C 2 that achieve capacity over a channel X → Y induce a unique output probability distribution on Y . If both codes are equally likely to be used a priori, an eavesdropper cannot identify the code that was actually used by processing Y . If the code C 1 is tied to message 0 and C 2 is tied to message 1, the message is completely secure given Y . We have shown that this approach achieves secrecy capacity when the wire tap channel system is made of symmetric DMCs. Other cases require a closer study. More generally, this approach can potentially be extended to study codes that induce the same output probability distribution across a given channel.
A drawback of using capacity-achieving codes is that they are difficult to find and construct except in some special cases. One such special case is when the wire tap channel is a binary erasure channel. Hence, codes such as optimized Tornado codes can be used across erasure wiretapper's channels as described above. However, we have shown that capacity-achieving codes are not necessary in this case. If a code exhibits a threshold behavior across a BEC (codes such as regular LDPC codes), its dual can be used effectively over a wire tap channel system with a BEC as the wiretapper's channel. This result enables the use of codes that can be more easily constructed.
When the wiretapper's channel is a BEC and the main channel is noiseless, we have presented codes that approach secrecy capacity. To our knowledge these are the first and only such codes.
For the case where both the main channel and the wiretapper's channel are BECs, we have studied two approaches for code design. The optimality and secrecy capacity of the constructions need to be studied and explored.
For the case where the wiretapper's channel is a BSC(p) and the main channel is noiseless, we have shown that codes with good error-detecting properties provide security. The capacity of this construction is − log 2 (1 − p), which is less than the secrecy capacity h(p). Capacity-approaching codes will probably be graph-based. Use of graph-based codes for the BSC wiretapper's channel is a subject for future study.
